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Abstract 
Comparative value arguments (CVA) suggest to jurors that a death sentence is appropriate 
because the victim’s value surpasses the defendant’s value. Jurors exposed to CVA are likely to 
misuse mitigation and victim impact evidence. The present study has a sample of 140 university 
students. A 2 x 4 + 1 between-groups factorial design was utilized to examine effects of 
mitigation and victim impact evidence in the context of CVA (held constant); and to test legal 
safeguard efficacy. A main effect was found of legal safeguards on jurors’ perceptions of 
prosecutorial misconduct, and a significant association was found between legal safeguards and 
sentence recommendation. Attitudes toward the death penalty mediated the predictive 
relationship between affective and cognitive factors and sentence recommendation.  
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Examining Comparative Value Arguments, Capital Sentencing Evidence, and Legal Safeguards 
Comparative value arguments have emerged as a result of the broad admissibility 
standard for victim impact evidence established by the Supreme Court’s decision in Payne v. 
Tennessee (1991). Beginning in the 1960’s, the victims’ rights movement gained momentum, 
leading to an expansion of the victim’s role in the criminal trial process. Although the Supreme 
Court previously found admission of victim impact evidence during capital sentencing 
unconstitutionally prejudicial in Booth v. Maryland (1987); in Payne, the court held the Eighth 
Amendment does not proscribe use of victim impact evidence during capital sentencing. The 
Payne court found evidence of the victim’s uniqueness permissible during sentencing, as long as 
the prejudiciality of the evidence does not render the trial fundamentally unfair (Gross, 2007). 
This vague criteria for determining constitutionality of victim impact evidence opened a flood 
gate for the persuasion of capital jurors using highly emotional testimony and inflammatory 
prosecutor argument (Logan, 1999; McCampbell, 2006; Myers & Greene, 2004; Smith, 2008). 
Comparative value arguments are a new and potent form of closing argument, and 
suggest to jurors that a death sentence is appropriate because the victim’s value surpasses the 
defendant’s value. Although the Supreme Court has not specifically ruled on the permissibility of 
this form of prosecutor argument, it can easily violate the standard of permissibility established 
by Payne, because jurors who engage in this comparison are likely to use victim impact evidence 
to evaluate the worth of the victim, rather than to consider the victim’s uniqueness (McCampbell, 
2006). Similar to victim impact statements, comparative value arguments pose a significant risk 
of shifting the focus of capital sentencing proceedings away from the blameworthiness of the 
defendant, and toward the victim (Gross, 2007). 
Although comparative value arguments are a relatively new trial phenomenon, 
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prosecutorial misconduct is not a new problem in capital sentencing. The harm caused by 
prosecutorial misconduct is magnified when prosecutors intentionally abuse power for the selfish 
purpose of increasing their conviction rates. Prosecutors have received a remarkable amount of 
leeway in their closing arguments and trial behavior. Legal scholars have suggested the breadth 
of their freedom stems from the infrequent reprimand offered by trial judges and higher courts. 
When defendants appeal based upon prosecutorial misconduct, appellate courts may find certain 
behaviors improper, but nevertheless uphold convictions in these cases (Gaines, 2007). Over 
time, this has allowed prosecutors to emphasize moral rather than evidential reasons for 
recommending the death penalty in capital cases, leading to unconstitutional enforcement of 
capital punishment (Platania, 1995). 
Prosecutors serve a dual role in capital trials: to aggressively seek justice, and to ensure 
the fair prosecution of criminals in accordance to constitutional principles. In this vein, the 
Eighth Amendment prohibits prosecutors from misleading jurors regarding their role in capital 
trials, and the evidence they are to deliberate on Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985). The Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects capital defendents from improper prosecutor 
comments which render the trial fundamentally unfair; including statements which misinform the 
jury about the correct application of law, or encourage jurors to recommend a death sentence 
based upon irrelevant extralegal factors. Established trial rules are intended to protect jurors from 
exposure to irrelevant or unreliable evidence (Bilaisis, 1983). Research demostrating the 
differential influence of extralegal and inadmissible information on juror verdict (Broeder, 1959; 
Carretta & Moreland, 1983; Kassin & Sommers, 1997; Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Pickel, 1995; 
Rind, Jaeger, Strohmetz, 1995; Steblay, Hosch, Culhane, & McWethy, 2006; Sue, Smith & 
Caldwell, 1973; Wolf & Montgomery, 1977;) and sentence recommendation (Platania, 1995; 
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Platania, Moran, 1999; Platania & Small, in press) indicates a strong need for regulatory rules of 
prosecutor behavior. 
Mitigation evidence also plays an important role in capital sentencing, by providing the 
jury with evidence of the defendant’s good character, or any other factor which might persuade 
the jury to recommend a sentence of life in prison without parole (McCampbell, 2006; 
Turlington, 2008). The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require capital jurors to consider any 
revelevent mitigating evidence which might connote leniency Lockett v. Ohio (1978). Lockett 
expanded the class of mitigating factors from a relatively contained list of statutorily defined 
mitigators (varying by state) to any and all mitigating factors which could influence the jury to 
recommend a life sentence (Doyle, 1987). While jurors have the freedom to determine the weight 
they will give to any mitigating evidence, they are not allowed to decide to exclude it entirely 
from their consideration (Barnett, Brodsky, & Price, 2007; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 1982). 
This new class of non-statutory mitigation was intended to enhance defendants’ due 
process rights. However, in the context of comparative value arguments and victim impact 
evidence, mitigation evidence portraying the defendant’s troubled life or difficult upbringing 
may be improperly used to contrast the lowly and incorrigible defendant against the esteemed 
victim, whose life the defendant took (McCampbell, 2006). Several psychological theories 
suggest, and numerous empirical works demonstrate legal safeguards designed to uphold due 
process are unable to neutralize the damaging effects of inadmissible information (Wilson, 
2004). Without adequate legal safeguards in place, inflammatory prosecutor arguments dismantle 
capital defendants’ due process and other constitutional guarantees.  
Comparative Value Arguments 
Considering the potential distortion of sentencing evidence created by comparative value 
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argumentation, it is necessary to further examine the ramifications of persuading jurors with this 
type of argument. Two forms of comparative value arguments have been documented in legal 
scholarship (McCampbell, 2006). Comparative Life Arguments persuade jurors to impose the 
death penalty because the victim lived a better life than the defendant. This type of argument 
often manifests as a timeline of the defendant’s and victim’s respective life events. Inevitably, a 
timeline of this sort reveals the victim’s successes or accomplishments, and the defendant’s 
struggles or pitfalls. This strategy communicates to the jury that at any given point in time, the 
victim was thriving, while the defendant was sinking into criminality. One salient example of 
comparative life argumentation originates from Humphries v. Ozmint (2005): 
In 1984 the victim met Pat, and they fell in love, and they got married. That’s the same 
year Shawn Paul Humphries committed two house break-ins at age 13…Then in 1988, 
July the 4th, Mendal “Dickie Smith” and his wife have a little baby girl…That’s the same 
year Shawn Paul Humphries went to jail for two years. 
In contrast, Comparative Worth Arguments compare the character of the victim and the 
defendant, and ask jurors to identify the value associated with each party’s life. Prosecutors use 
comparative worth arguments to suggest to jurors that by deciding the victim’s life had a higher 
value than the defendant’s life, they should likewise decide the defendant deserves to die. 
According to the court’s opinion in Humphries v. Ozmint (2005), comparative worth arguments 
appear more effective in obtaining death sentences, and therefore pose a greater risk to due 
process, by explicitly urging jurors to compare human worth, rather than the cumulative quality 
of various life events. In Hall v. Catoe (2004), the prosecutor argued: 
If you let this murderer walk out of this courtroom with his life then you are saying that 
his life is worth more than the victim’s. I urge you to assign the defendant his value on 
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the basis that he committed an aggravated murder. He should be found less valuable 
because he is a convicted killer. 
Although this type of argument is yet to be empirically tested in the field of jury 
simulation research, legal commentators have identified constitutional threats posed by 
comparitive value arguments. The Eighth Amendment prohibits arbitrary enforcement of capital 
punishment. In capital trials, prosecutors have a heightened duty to refrain from inducing the 
jury’s passions or prejudices (McCampbell, 2006).  Capital sentencing decisions carry 
burdensome consequences which amplify judicial interests in ensuring these decisions are made 
carefully; and are based on reason rather than emotion (Gardner v. Florida, 1977). As specified 
in Caldwell, the Constitution prohibits prosecutors from making unduly inflammatory comments, 
or comments which mischaracterize the jury’s role. By engaging in improper trial conduct, such 
as appealing to jurors’ emotions, prosecutors unfairly tip the scales against the defendant. 
Emotionally driven prosecutor argument places an unconstitutional burden on the defendant, 
who must counteract damaging information, and attempt to restore the jury from negative 
inferences drawn from the improper evidence (Bilaisis, 1983).    
Comparative life statements argued in Humphries were the basis of the defendant’s 
appeal to the Fourth Circuit Federal Court. The Fourth Circuit court found arguments comparing 
the defendant to the victim were unconstitutional offerings of victim impact evidence, and 
violated the Payne standard. The Humphries court recognized the prosecutor’s repeated contrast 
of the victim’s vitality with the defendant’s demise encouraged the jury to impose a death 
sentence based upon a brief comparison of human worth; rather than a careful weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating factors. Although the court vacated Humphries’ death sentence on the 
basis of a Payne violation, the Payne decision makes no specific assertion regarding the 
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admissibility of defendant-to-victim comparisons. The Humphries court found imposition of a 
death sentence based upon “explicit and pointed comparative worth argument” to be 
fundamentally at odds with the prescribed use of victim impact evidence; to inform jurors about 
specific harm caused by the defendant’s crime (Kuhn, 2006).  
However, one judge’s partial dissention of the Humphries opinion illuminates the 
alarming likelihood that this type of argument will remain a problematic feature of capital 
sentencing. Judge Hamilton maintained the Humphries majority erred in finding comparative 
prosecutor arguments in violation of the Payne standard. Hamilton reasoned, information about 
the defendant and the victim referred to in the prosecutor’s closing argument had been already 
been presented by witnessess and was therefore in the record – differences between the 
defendant the victim were apparent before the prosecutor’s closing argument. He argued 
Humphries had the opportunity to demonstrate his uniqueness, by calling 13 witnessess to offer 
mitigating evidence at sentencing; the state mutually maintains the right to demonstrate the 
victim’s uniqueness by offering victim impact evidence describing the victim’s successes.  
Hamilton’s dessention argued Payne had not established parameters to identify what 
form of victim impact evidence might violate the fundamental fairness standard. The state has a 
“legitimate interest” in demonstrating the victim’s personal characteristics and evidence of the 
harm caused by the crime. Furthermore, Hamilton emphasized that victim impact evidence was 
intended, under Payne, to counteract mitigating evidence. He urged victim-to-defendant 
comparisons are inescapable under Payne, and inevitable in capital sentencing, where the jury is 
asked to determine the weight of non-statutory mitigation and victim impact evidence. 
Numerous judicial districts and State Supreme Courts have converged with the 
Humphries majority regarding the prejudicial and inflammatory nature of statements comparing 
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the defendant and the victim. In State v. Muhammad (1996), the New Jersey Supreme Court 
ruled sentencing authorities could not consider crimes committed against virtuous people to be 
more heinous than crimes committed against socially undersirable victims. In State v. Koskovich 
(2001), the New Jersey Supreme Court deemphasized the distinction between comparative life 
and comparative worth arguments; reasoning that a comparison of the lives of the defendant and 
the victim is effectually identical to a comparison of their respective worths. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court stated any comparison between victim and defendant will always prejudice the 
jury, because defendants will persistently be seen as more delinquent, and of lower value.  
In State v. Story (1995), the Missouri Supreme Court ruled against prosecutor statements 
blatantly characterizing the defendant’s life as less valuable than the victim’s life. The Storey 
court declared this manifestation of victim impact evidence to be a gross misinterpretation of 
law; one which could lead the jury to arbitrarily or capriciously impose the death penalty. The 
court argued by using the defendant’s act of murder to distinguish him from the victim, 
comparative value arguments create a new aggravating factor which applies to all murderers. 
While this sentiment conveys the court’s awareness of the capability of comparative value 
arguments to eviscerate constitutionally guaranteed due process rights, not all courts have 
recognized comparative value arguments as a breach of the permissibility standard established by 
Payne. 
In State v. Haseldon (2003), and Jackson v. State (2000), The Texas Supreme Court 
found value-of-life comparisons between the victim and the defendant had been appropriately 
admitted. The Haseldon court held the prosecutor’s argument properly reminded the jury of the 
victim’s unique life, and was relevent in determining the defendant’s culpability. The court 
asserted “prosecutors have a duty to advocate zealously that the facts in evidence warrant 
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imposition of the death penalty, and they are pemitted wide latitude in their arguments.” This 
wide latitude cannot be denied. While many courts have ruled against the use of comparative 
value arguments in capital sentencing, there is an evident lack of consensus on this matter. Until 
the Supreme Court decides against this distorted application of victim impact evidence, 
comparative value arguments are likely to pervade capital sentencing procedings (Smith, 2008).  
The Supreme Court denied certiori to Humphries, and has likewise rejected opportunities 
to revisit previous rulings on victim impact evidence, indicating the persuasion of capital jurors 
with damaging comparative arguments will continue (Kuhn, 2006; Smith, 2008). Members of the 
legal community warn against the allowance of comparative value arguments due to moral and 
ethical implications. Specifically, the failure of Payne to prohibit comparative value arguments 
enables the capital punishment of defendants based upon their societal status. Arguments which 
compare the societal value of the defendant and the victim are counterintuitive to models of legal 
equality. Hypothetically, if comparative value arguments were presented in all trials, wealthy 
individuals with high social standing are likely to disproportionately benefit over defendants with 
less desirable positions in society (Smith, 2008). This presents a startling but clear violation of 
the constitutional right to a fair trial. 
The line between evidence of a victim’s uniqueness and evidence of societal value is 
difficult to distinguish (Smith, 2008). Opponants of victim impact evidence argue that 
presentation of victim impact evidence inherently suggests some lives are more valuable than 
others. If the legal system is truly based on equality, all human lives lost should represent 
commensurate losses to society; the personal characteristics of the victim should not influence 
jurors’ perceptions of defendant culpability, or capital sentencing decisions. If juries are using a 
comparative value analysis to form capital sentencing decisions, cases where a valuable victim 
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was allegedly killed by a worthless defendant would be easiest to argue. This value ratio could 
lead prosecutors to seek the death penalty more frequentlywhen the defendant meets this 
description, further violating the defendant’s right to fair trial (Kuhn, 2006).  In light of these 
constitutional threats, it is neccessary to assess how evidence presented at capital sentencing 
influences sentence recommendations, and whether current leagal safeguards are adequately 
protecting the trial process against pervasive inflammatory prosecutor argument.  
Mitigation Evidence 
In the penalty phase of capital trials, jurors are instructed by the court on what evidence is 
permissible for their consideration, and how they are to weigh evidence to determine the 
appropriate sentence. Jurors are presented evidence of aggravating circumstances, which 
magnify the wrongfulness of the crime (i.e. killing a law enforcement officer, killing for hire, 
committing a murder in the course of a felony) and evidence of mitigating circumstances, which 
reduce the defendant’s culpability (i.e. severe emotional distress, age, no record of prior criminal 
activity). Capital juries can also consider any aspect of the defendant or the crime which has 
mitigating value (Lockett v. Ohio, 1978; Luginbuhl & Middendorf, 1988;Turlington, 2006).  
While deliberating, jurors are faced with answering several questions: Has an aggravating 
circumstance been proven beyond a reasonable doubt? Do the aggravating circumstances warrant 
the death penalty? Do any mitigating factors exist? Do the mitigating circumstances diminish the 
appropriateness of the death penalty? These questions represent the substantive workload of 
capital sentencing juries. Research suggests death qualified jurors are conviction prone in 
determining guilt, and death qualified jurors have demonstrated less acceptance of mitigating 
circumstances than those who strongly oppose the death penalty (Luginbuhl, 1992). Furthermore, 
individuals who strongly oppose the death penalty considered mitigating circumstances 
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significantly more than their death qualified counterparts. The differential consideration of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances by death qualified and excludable jurors results in 
capital juries biased toward a penalty of death (Luginbuhl, & Middendorf, 1988). 
Due to jurors’ limitless consideration of mitigating circumstances established by Lockett 
(1978), defendants present a wide range of highly variable mitigating evidence. While some 
defense teams are able to show the defendant’s good character and deeds, many defendants ask 
for mercy on the basis of mental deficiency, lack of education, poor physical health, history of 
substance abuse, or a troubled upbringing. Mitigating evidence which negatively characterizes 
the defendant may explain factors which contributed to the defendant’s commission of the crime, 
and cause jurors to vote for leniency. However, in the context of comparative value arguments, 
mitigation can lower the defendant’s value in the eyes of the jury. Stevenson, Bottoms, & 
Diamond (2010) describe research on juror’s perceptions of this type of mitigation as 
inconclusive. Research indicates jurors demonstrate less punitiveness in sentencing a defendant 
who presented evidence of child abuse, compared to no history of child abuse (Barnett, Brodsky, 
& Davis, 2004; Stalans & Henry, 2009). Stevenson, et al. (2010) tested a history of child abuse, 
among other potetionally biasing mitigating factors, and found that in similated juror 
deliberations, jurors discussed this factor as an aggravator signficantly more than as a mitigator. 
However, other findings suggest mitigating circumstances such as a history of child abuse, 
alcohol, or drug abuse can lead to greater punitiveness among jurors (Garvey, 1998; Gordon & 
Brodsky, 2007; Lynch & Haney, 2000; Salerno & Bottoms, 2009; Stevenson et al., 2008).  
Consequently, mitigation evidence presented to communicate the defendant’s troubled 
life is likely to have harmful ironic effects, or a backfire effect (Barnett, et al., 2007; Stevenson, 
et al., 2010) on sentencing when jurors are exposed to comparative value arguments. Inversely, 
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mitigation evidence which conveys the defendant’s social value or positive contributions to the 
community may raise the defendant’s value. When jurors are asked to reach a sentencing 
decision by comparing the values of the defendant and the victim, the more value jurors assign to 
the defendant, the less likely they are to recommend death. (McCampbell, 2006). 
Victim Impact Evidence 
Comparative value arguments ask jurors to weigh the defendant’s value against the 
victim’s value. While mitigation evidence provides insight into the life of the defendant, the 
prosecution uses victim impact evidence to portray the victim’s life. When the victim is not 
available to testify, as in capital trials, family members or other close acquaintances of the victim 
provide a depiction of the life lead by the victim, and the impact of the loss on survivors 
(Gordon, & Brodsky, 2007). These witnessess provide the jury with positive details about the 
victim’s personal characteristics which are likely to boost the victim’s value in the context of a 
comparative value argument. Jurors may even raise the victim’s value because the victim did not 
murder the defendant, and therefore represents a more valuable member of society. Although the 
Payne court intended this type of evidence to provide a “quick glimpse” into the life of the 
victim, victim impact evidence has spiraled beyond the scope of this goal, and is often the 
centerpeice of capital sentencing trials (Logan, 1999; McCampbell, 2006; Myers & Greene, 
2004; Turlington, 2008). Introduction of this type of evidence can cause the focus sentencing 
procedings to stray away from reason and the defendant’s culpability, and toward the 
emotionality and the victim’s suffering (Gross, 2007). 
Trial judges have broad discretion in admitting victim impact evidence, and there are no 
existing instructional provisions to inform jurors on how to consider victim impact evidence, or 
what burden of proof to apply (Logan, 1999; Turlington, 2008). Research suggests this type of 
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evidence has a prejudicial effect on capital jurors. Across several studies, participants exposed to 
victim impact evidence were significantly more punitive (Erez & Tontadonato, 1990; Tsoudis, & 
Smith-Lovin, 1998) and more likely to vote for the death penalty than individuals who had not 
heard victim impact evidence (Luginbuhl & Burkhead, 1995; Myers & Arbuthnot, 1999; Salerno 
& Bottoms, 2009).  
In one study, researchers varied the presentation of the victim to be either high-
respectability or low-respectability and found participants gave more consideration to mitigating 
factors when presented impact evidence of the low-respectability victim (Greene, Koehring, & 
Quiat, 1998). Participants also percieved survivors’ suffering as greater when presented the loss 
of a high-respectability victim, compared to a low-respectability victim. Additionally, jurors 
rated the social standing of high and low respectability victims, and greater social standing was 
positively associated with the degree of harm caused by the crime (Greene, 1999).These findings 
indicate defendants may receive differential treatment in capital sentencing depending on the 
social desirability of the victim (Myers, Weidemann, & Pearce, 2006). 
In an attempt to answer some of the due process questions associated with the Payne 
decision, researchers have tested the degree to which victim impact evidence negatively 
characterizing the defendant influences capital sentencing decisions. Death qualified community 
members were more likely to sentence the defendant to death when presented victim impact 
evidence containing dehumanizing language, and when victim impact evidence was delivered in 
a highly emotional presentation (Myers, Godwin, Latter, & Winstanley, 2004; Tsoudis & Smith-
Lovin, 1998).  
Research also suggests capital jurors are influenced by who presents victim impact 
evidence. Green-McGowan and Myers (2004) found perceptions of survivor suffering were 
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greatest when victim impact evidence was presented by a family member, compared to a 
coworker or rescue-first responder. Participant-jurors have also been found to sentence 
defendants with greater punitiveness when exposed to testimony regarding a victim with a high 
level of suffering, compared to a victim with a low level of suffering (Kerr, & Kurtz, 1977). In 
another study, participants were exposed to one of four levels of harm expressed through victim 
impact evidence. Jurors’ ratings of negative emotionality were positively associated with the 
degree of harm; however ratings of negative emotion did not significantly affect sentencing 
decisions (Myers, Lynn, & Arbuthnot, 2002).  
Legal Safeguards 
Given the emotional nature of capital sentencing evidence, and the potential for jurors to 
improperly weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances in capital sentencing, a clearly 
problematic relationship is likely to exist when capital jurors are exposed to improper prosecutor 
arguments. In addition to the distorting effect of comparative value arguments on non-statutory 
aggravating and mitigating evidence, this type of argument has a volatile potential to influence 
capital sentencing decisions due to the inadequacy of current legal safeguards against 
prosecutorial misconduct. Numerous studies lend substantial empirical support to the resiliance 
of various forms of inadmissible evidence in the presence of legal safeguards (Broeder, 1959; 
Carretta & Moreland, 1983; Kassin & Sommers, 1997; Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Pickel, 1995; 
Platania & Moran, 1999; Platania & Small, in press; Rind, et al., 1995; Steblay, et al., 2006; Sue, 
et al., 1973; Wolf & Montgomery, 1977). However, of these studies, only two examine the utility 
of legal safeguards to inhibit jurors’ consideration of improper prosecutor argument in particular 
(Platania & Moran, 1999; Platania & Small, in press). 
The courts operate under the assumption that adequate legal safeguards against 
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prosecutorial misconduct are in place, but researchers and legal scholars suggest prosecutorial 
misconduct is a frequently occurring problem lacking desperately needed mechanisms of 
regulation (Bilaisis, 1983; Gaines, 2007; Platania & Moran, 1999; Platania & Small, in press; 
Schoenfeld, 2005). By consistently applying harmless error doctrine to appeals based upon 
claims of prosecutorial misconduct, courts tend to affirm convictions even in cases where 
prosecutorial misconduct appears egregious. The harmless error standard allows appellate courts 
to concentrate on the weight of the case evidence, rather than on prosecutors’ motives or 
behavior. In these cases, the courts believe the same verdict or decision would have been reached 
in the absence of the misconduct. Resulting decisions and written opinions do not sufficiently 
discourage prosecutors from behaving improperly, since the prosecutor’s misconduct is rarely a 
cited reason for reversal. The legal community has some awareness of the threats to fairness and 
impartiality caused by improper prosecutor argument, evidenced by the United States Attorneys’ 
Manual; but a dangerous disparity exists between the awareness of the legal community and the 
courts’ decisions, which threatens the intergrity of the entire legal system (Bilaisis, 1983). 
 Since appellate courts are not likely to reverse convictions on the grounds of 
prosecutorial misconduct, prosecutors must act with heightened caution in capital trials. If 
improper or inadmissible information is entered into the sentencing phase of a capital trial, 
opposing counsel must object, and a judicial instruction may or may not be delivered. Whether 
an instruction is offered or not, Attorney Objection → Curative Instruction remains the only 
possible route to correcting the information error. However, psychological theory and emprical 
findings provide burdensome reasons to be skeptical of the likelihood this process will produce 
the desired correction in information processing – disregarding improper information. 
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Attorney objection. 
Few experimental studies have directly tested the cognitive and social psychological 
effects of attorney objection; but several theories can be used to explain this attentional 
phenomenon, which are empirically supported. Essentially, an attorney objection is an 
interruption of trial proceedings. When viewed as a cognitive event, an interruption has been 
theorized to produce changes in attention. Researchers suggest interruptions can increase 
attentional demands (Eccleston, & Crombez, 1999; Geiger & Reeves, 1993; Krugman, 1983). 
Interrupting an individual while performing a task may increase memory for the task, known as 
the Zeigarnik Effect (Zeigernik, 1927). The attention-allocation theory proposes task-relevant 
interruptions enhance task-attention (Maentylae & Sgaramella, 1997). When this theory is 
applied to the capital juror, the defense attorney’s objection to an improper prosecutor argument 
is an interruption of the juror’s task, and is related to the juror’s task. Consequently, the juror’s 
attention to the proceedings at the time of the interruption would be increased; ultimately 
resulting in increased attention to inadmissible information.  
The relationships among attention, memory, and interruptions have been studied in a 
wide range of contexts. Molly Juliann Walker Wilson (2004) is among the first researchers to 
manipulate attorney objection during criminal trial, and to empirically separate objection from 
instruction. Wilson (2004) articulates the need for research which manipulates legal safeguards 
in a way that allows experimentors to compare objection-present versus objection-absent 
conditions, and objection-overruled versus objection-sustained conditions. In this way, 
researchers can identify the effect of an objection, and examine whether jurors treat objected-to 
evidence differently depending on the judge’s admissibility ruling. Wilson (2004) found mock 
jurors who heard objected-to testimony returned more guilty verdicts than mock jurors who 
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heard the same testimony with no objection; indicating the objection increased juror attention to 
the evidence. Wilson (2004) argues objections are problematic even when the objected-to 
evidence is ruled admissible. Even if the objected-to evidence is proper for the jury’s 
consideration, an attorney objection may draw undue attention to the evidence, and the judge’s 
affirmative ruling on the evidence may lead the jury to believe the evidence bears particular 
signficance. 
Judicial instruction. 
In the case of judicial instructions to disregard inadmissible or improper information, 
empirical studies and theories are both available to support and explain the failure of these 
instructions to cause the desired information processing outcome. Wilson (2004) posed a concern 
that attention drawn to inadmissible information by attorney objection may overpower the 
instruction to disregard the evidence. Psychologists have studied directed forgetting; a construct 
which parallels the court’s request of jurors to disregard inadmissible evidence, or to act as 
though the evidence had not been introduced. Findings consistently suggest individuals are more 
successful in forgetting meaningless information, such as a three letter trigram, than meaningful 
or task-relevant information (Fischoff, 1975, 1977; Geiselman, 1974; Golding, Fowler, Long, & 
Latta, 1990; Golding & Keenan, 1985; Weiner, 1966; Wyer & Budesheim, 1987).  
Wegner’s (1994) theory of Ironic Processes of Mental Control details the mechanisms of 
suppressing a thought; one must engage in continual mental self-monitoring to ensure the 
prohibited thought has not intruded. In doing so, individuals inevitably attend to this forbidden 
stimuli, and experience the thought intrusion they are attempting to avoid. Brehm’s (1966) 
reactance theory describes the tendancy for an individual’s desire to perform a specific action to 
increase when freedom to perform the action is threatened. According to reactance theory, as the 
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percieved threat to freedom intensifies, the desire to perform the forbidden action likewise 
intensifies. Both theories indicate a possible backfire effect of judicial instructions to disregard 
inadmissible evidence, resulting in greater consideration of inadmissible evidence (Wilson, 
2004).  
Research has illustrated the dubious efficacy of this type of instruction to shield jurors 
from inadmissible evidence when determining verdict (Broeder, 1959; Carretta & Moreland, 
1983; Kassin & Sommers, 1997; Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Pickel, 1995; Rind, et al., 1995; Steblay, 
et al., 2006; Sue, et al., 1973; Wolf & Montgomery, 1977). However, far fewer studies have been 
done on the effectiveness of instructions to disregard inadmissible capital sentencing evidence 
(Platania & Moran, 1999; Platania & Small, in press). Capital sentencing presents unique 
circumstances under which jurors must weigh aggravating and mitigating evidence, and hear 
highly prejudicial victim impact statements. Capital jurors are undeniably faced with an 
emotionally and cognitively demanding set of responsibilities. The impact of both attorney 
objection and judicial instruction must be empirically evaluated in the context of capital 
sentencing, because these remain the primary safeguards available to defendants during capital 
sentencing trials.  
Affect & Cognition 
One primary concern regarding the introduction of sentencing evidence is the likelihood 
that emotional evidence will inflame the jury (Myers, et al., 2006). In addition to emotionally 
driven victim impact and mitiagtion evidence, prosecutors may tap juror emotionality by 
attempting to elicit negative emotions about the defendant, such as anger and disgust (Salerno & 
Bottoms, 2010). Based on previous rulings, the courts seem to be aware of the problems 
associated with sentencing defendants  out of emotion, passion, or prejudice (Eddings v. 
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Oklahoma, 1982; Gardner v. Florida, 1977).  However, research has broadly demonstrated the 
influential role of emotion in decision making processes.  
Individuals have a tendency to make judgments consistent with their mood, known as the 
mood-congruency effect. Mood can also affect decision making indirectly, by altering 
information processessing strategies. Happiness has been associated with less effortful 
information processing, compared to sadness. In contrast, anger tends to produce less detailed 
information processesing, and more heuristic processessing (Myers, et al., 2006). One possible 
explanation for this pattern is individuals’ motivation to maintain a positive state such as 
happiness; and therefore engage in less effortful searching for information which could cause a 
mood shift. Alternatively, some theorists propose an attributional paradigm, whereby firm 
emotions such as happiness and anger lead to certainty, and nebulous emotions such as sadness 
cause uncertainty; the less certain an individual is, the more extensively he or she will process 
information (Myers, et al., 2006).  
According to the Affect Infusion Model (AIM), judgments we make on a daily basis are 
not purely rational cognitions, but are influenced by affective state (Forgas, 1995). Forgas (1995) 
described four distinct cognitive processes: direct access, motivated, heuristic, and substantive 
processing strategies. Direct and motivated processing strategies involve retrieval of previously 
formed judgments, either directly, or according to goal-oriented search patterns. In the absence 
of a prior judgment or a motivational goal, an individual is likely to use heuristic or substantive 
processing; whereby a new judgment is created based upon simplified (heuristic) or extensive 
(substantive) constructive processing. These second two strategies are more susceptible to the 
infusion of affectively loaded information, because they require more open-ended searching than 
direct access and motivated processing strategies, and employ a broader search scope. 
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Several variables, including personality traits, motivational goals, cognitive capacity, 
familiarity with the target, and judgment complexity determine which processing strategy is 
employed (Forgas, 1995). Jurors in capital trials are required to construct judgments and 
evaluations of new and complex information.  In court, jurors must absorb a large load of 
cognitively demanding information, and must weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
determine the credibility of witness testimony, and render a verdict or sentence recommendation. 
These demanding juror tasks necessitate constructive processing such as heuristic and 
substantive strategies; supporting the use of the AIM in jury simulation research.  
The Need for Cognition (NFC) has been connected to methods of information processing 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), such as the evaluation of testimony 
heard in court (Butler, & Moran, 2007). NFC is defined as “the tendency to engage in and enjoy 
effortful cognitive activity” (Cacioppo, et al., 1984). Individuals with a high need for cognition 
have a tendency to process information intensively. In contrast, lower NFC individuals tend to 
process less intensively, use less case specific information, and utilize more peripheral cues. 
Researchers have found death qualified jurors to exhibit a significantly lower NFC than those 
jurors excluded by the Witt standard (Butler, & Moran; Wainwright v. Witt, 1985). 
Recently, researchers have suggested individuals’ susceptibility to emotional information 
is strongly related to need for cognition (Haddock, Maio, Arnold, & Huskinson, 2008; Maio & 
Esses, 2001). Identified as need for affect, this construct has been studied as an individual 
difference factor in studies addressing level of receptiveness to cognitively and affectively 
persuasive messages. Results indicate both need for affect and need for cognition reliably predict 
susceptibility to affective or cognitive messages (Haddock et al., p. 777). Specifically, 
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individuals high in need for affect and low in need for cognition were more persuaded by 
affective messages compared to those high in need for cognition.  
Need for affect may play an important role in explaining the persuasive effect of 
comparative value arguments, mitigation and victim impact evidence, especially in relation to 
need for cognition (Salerno & Bottoms, 2009). Individuals high in need for affect and low in 
need for cognition may be more likely to find comparative value arguments persuasive compared 
to those high in need for cognition and low in need for affect. Research in this area will provide 
important information in understanding the affective and cognitive processes associated with 
jurors’ sentencing decisions.  
In contrast to many robust findings demonstrating the prejudicial influence of victim 
impact evidence, an insufficient amount of empirical work examines the ways in which jurors 
consider other types of capital sentence evidence, such as mitigation evidence (Salerno & 
Bottoms, 2009). Uproar in the legal community regarding the improper use of comparative value 
arguments, and its detrimental effect on defendants’ due process rights (Kuhn, 2006; 
McCampbell, 2006; Smith, 2008) operates as a signal to the field of psychology that current 
legal assumptions about capital decision making do not accurately reflect the tendencies of 
jurors. Therefore, patterns of emotion and judgment related to capital sentencing require 
additional empirical testing. Considering the dearth of empirical research on comparative value 
arguments, and their potential to misguide the jury’s consideration of mitigation and victim 
impact evidence, the proposed research intends to examine the differential influence of these 
variables, and the impact of attorney objection and curative instruction on capital sentencing 
decisions. 
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Proposed Hypotheses 
H1:  Attorney objection will increase juror attention to objected-to information (CVA 
in closing argument), leading to an increase in death penalty recommendations in 
both conditions where attorney objection is present, compared to conditions 
where attorney objection is absent. 
H2: Judicial instructions to disregard improper prosecutor statements will be tested to 
determine whether and to what extent curative instruction influences jurors’ 
sentencing decisions, and their consideration of comparative value arguments.  
H3: A main effect of troubled life mitigation is predicted, and is expected to lower 
jurors’ perceptions of the defendant’s value, ultimately leading to more death 
penalty recommendations than in the control condition, where troubled life 
mitigation is not presented. 
H4:   A main effect of Victim Impact Evidence on perceptions of comparative worth 
statements is predicted. In the context of comparative value arguments, victim 
impact evidence should result in the more death penalty recommendations and 
decreased perceptions of the defendant’s value.  
H5: In light of the characteristic differences past research has shown between general 
and death qualified samples, participants’ scores on the Attitudes toward the 
Death Penalty scale is predicted to mediate the relationship between mood, affect 
and cognition on sentencing decisions.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were pre-screened for jury eligibility to serve on a capital trial, using the Witt 
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standard (Wainwright v. Witt, 1985), as well as the criteria of having a valid driver’s license. The 
sample consisted of 140 undergraduate students, recruited from two universities in New England. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of nine experimental conditions. Participation 
required approximately one hour. Informed consent (see Appendix A) was obtained prior to 
participation, and participation was followed by debriefing (see Appendix E).  
Materials 
Participants completed a pre-trial survey instrument (see Appendix B) consisting of 
demographic items, the Positive Affect Negative Affect Scale – Short Form (PANAS-SF; 
Thompson, 2007) to measure affective state, Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty (ATDP; O’neil, 
Patry, & Penrod, 2004), Need for Affect (NFA; Maio & Esses, 2001) and Need for Cognition 
(NFC; Caccioppo, et al., 1984) scales. 
Trial simulation materials (see Appendix C) were based on the case information from 
Humphries v. Ozmint (2005) and Hall v. Catoe (2004). The case facts came directly from 
Humphries, and comparative worth arguments came directly from Hall. Trial materials included 
a summary of the guilt phase with information regarding the events leading up to the murder: 
The night before the killing the defendant and a friend were drinking, stole a gun, and decided to 
rob a store clerk. In the course of the robbery, the clerk reached under the counter for a gun; the 
defendant then fired a shot which struck the victim in the head. This was followed by the judge’s 
pre-sentencing instructions, attorney opening statements, witness presentation of victim impact 
and mitigation evidence, and attorney closing arguments. 
Post-trial dependent measures (see Appendix D) included sentence recommendation, 
manipulation checks, and Likert ratings of confidence in sentence, witness credibility, and 
consideration of sentencing evidence. Participants completed a post-trial PANAS-SF, and Victim 
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Concern Scale (VCS; Clements, Brannen, Kirkley, Gordon, & Church, 2006) Factor 2 to assess 
attitudes toward victims of violent crime at the time of determining sentence. 
Design & Procedure 
The proposed study utilizes a 2 (Victim Impact Evidence: Present v. Absent) x 4 (Legal 
Safeguards: Objection-Overruled v. Objection-Sustained v. Objection-Sustained with curative 
instruction v. None) + 1 (Control: No Mitigation, No Victim Impact Evidence, No Legal 
Safeguard) between-groups factorial design. Death qualified, jury-eligible participants completed 
the pre-trial survey instrument to identify individual difference factors related to the evaluation 
of capital sentencing evidence.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of 9 conditions (8 experimental conditions, 
and one control condition). Participants read the trial simulation materials describing the case of 
Humphries v. Ozmint, (2005), and rendered a verdict (guilty/not guilty). Pre-sentencing judicial 
instructions were constant across all conditions. Prosecutor opening statements introduced the 
witnesses in victim impact present conditions, and only discuss statutory aggravating factors in 
victim impact absent conditions. The defense attorney opening statement is constant across all 
conditions. When present, permissible victim impact evidence was offered by one family 
member and one community member. The defendant also called one family member and one 
community member to testify to the defendant’s troubled life (dysfunctional home and difficulty 
in school). In the control condition, non-statutory mitigation was not presented.   
The defense attorney’s closing argument remained constant across all conditions. The 
prosecutor’s closing argument contained three comparative worth statements, drawn from Hall v. 
Catoe (2004), in which the prosecutor explicitly requests jurors assign a value to the life of the 
victim and the defendant. Comparative worth is not a manipulated variable, and is constant 
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across all conditions. The present study did not test the differential influence of comparative 
worth arguments, because preliminary findings have identified main effects for both comparative 
worth and comparative life statements on sentence recommendation, in the direction of harsher 
sentences. Additionally, preliminary findings suggest the prejudicial influence of comparative 
worth statements is stronger than that of comparative life statements (Serpa, Small, & Platania, 
2010).  
The legal safeguard manipulation occurred half-way through the prosecutor’s closing 
argument, to ensure the objection was timely when present; and to maintain ecological validity. 
All elements of the trial were held constant except for the manipulations listed. Following is a 
brief description of each legal safeguard condition: 
Objection-overruled condition.  
The defense attorney objected to the prosecutor’s line of argument half-way through the 
closing argument, and the judge responded, “the objection is overruled. Counselor, you may 
continue”. 
 Objection-sustained condition.  
The defense attorney objected to the prosecutor’s line of argument half-way through the 
closing argument, and the judge responded, “the objection is sustained.”  
Objection-sustained with curative instruction. 
The defense attorney objected to the prosecutor’s line of argument half-way through the 
closing argument, and the judge responded, “Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, there was an 
objection by the Defense to the Prosecutor’s line of argument, which was sustained. Closing 
arguments are not evidence for your consideration. In his closing argument, the prosecutor made 
several statements comparing the worth of a defendant's life with that of his victim or comparing 
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the way in which the defendant and the victim lived their lives. This line of argument is 
inflammatory. Consider the case as though this line of argument was not expressed.” (Donnelly 
v. DeChristoforo, 1974). 
No legal safeguard condition. 
The defense attorney did not object throughout the prosecutor’s closing argument, and no 
comment or instruction was given by the judge. 
Following the trial simulation, jurors provided individual sentence recommendations (life 
in prison without parole v. death). Jurors completed all post-trial measures, including 
manipulation checks, items measuring perceived importance of due process rules and 
disregarding inadmissible evidence, VCS items, and post-trial PANAS-SF to assess mood effects 
associated with exposure to sentencing evidence. Primary dependent measures included ratings 
of the degree to which prosecutor and witness statements influenced sentencing 
recommendations. 
Results 
Sample Demographics 
 Of the sample of 140 participants, 43.6% were male, and 56.4% were female. All 
participants fell between the age range of 18 to 34, with the vast majority (98.6%) being between 
18 and 24 years of age, and only two participants (1.4%) being between 25-34 years of age. 
When asked about racial background, 90% of the sample identified themselves as Caucasian, 
4.3% identified themselves as Hispanic, and 5% described themselves as “Other”. Considering 
data was collected in undergraduate courses, it is not surprising that 81.4% described their 
employment status as student, with only 2.9% and 10.7% reporting full-time and part-time 
employment, respectively. All but one member of the sample described their marital status as 
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Single (99.3%).  
 Regarding religious affiliation, 52.9% of the sample reported a Catholic affiliation, 
17.1% reported a Protestant affiliation, 2.1% reported a Jewish affiliation, and 27.9% selected 
“Other”. When asked about their political views, 31.4% of the population identified themselves 
as liberal 27.9% identified themselves as slightly liberal, 22.1% as slightly conservative, and 
16.4% as conservative. 70% of the sample reported being registered voters. Only three 
participant (2.1%) had served on a civil jury, and four participants (2.9%) had served on a 
criminal jury. Just under half of the sample (47.1%) reported having a close friend or relative in 
the justice system. 
Death Qualification 
Our sample was death qualified based on participants’ responses to three qualifying 
items. Participants were excluded from further analyses if they did not have a valid driver’s 
license (4.3%), if they reported having any views on the death penalty that would prevent or 
substantially impair their consideration of both penalties, in violation of the Witt standard 
(16.4%), and if they felt the death penalty was either appropriate  (8.6%) or inappropriate (5.7%) 
in all capital cases. These exclusion criteria produced a death-qualified sample of 100 
participants.  
Scale Reliabilities  
 In order to assess the scale reliabilities of our dependent measures, a series of reliability 
analyses were conducted. The pre-trial PANAS items measuring positive affect demonstrated a 
Cronbach’s alpha = .87, n = 10. The range of responses measured by this scale was 13 to 45, 
with higher scale scores indicating higher reporting of positive affect. The pre-trial PANAS 
items measuring negative affect had a Cronbach’s alpha = .78, n = 10; responses ranged from 10-
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31 with higher scale scores indicating higher ratings of negative affect. Attitudes Toward the 
Death Penalty (ATDP) items were highly reliable as a scale, Cronbach’s alpha = .84, n = 15. 
Responses to this scale ranged from 28 – 118, with higher scores indicating greater endorsement 
of the death penalty.  
 Need for Affect and Need for Cognition were also analyzed for scale reliability, and both 
demonstrated strong reliability. For Need for Affect, Cronbach’s alpha = .86, n = 25, and 
responses ranged from 37 to 118, with higher scores reflecting a higher need for affect. The Need 
for Cognition scale had a Cronbach’s alpha = .82, n = 19, and responses ranged from 27 to 86, 
with higher scores reflecting a higher need for cognition.  
 Post-trial PANAS items measuring positive affect had a Cronbach’s alpha = .89, n = 10. 
Responses to this scale ranged from 10-47, with higher scores reflecting higher ratings of 
positive affect. Post-trial PANAS items measuring negative also demonstrated suitability to use 
as a scale, with Cronbach’s alpha = .84, n = 19; and responses ranging from 27 – 86, with higher 
scores demonstrating greater self-reported negative affect.  The ten Victim Concern Scale items 
assessing attitudes toward victims of violent crimes were reliable as a scale, with Cronbach’s 
alpha = .84, n = 10. Responses to this scale ranged from 35 – 50, with higher scores reflecting 
greater concern for victims.  
Hypothesis Tests 
Among our primary dependent measures were three items assessing jurors’ consideration 
of comparative worth statements in determining sentence. All three comparative worth items 
were significantly intercorrelated, at p < .001 (See Table 1 for inter-item correlations). This 
provided support to create a scale of the three items, which had an acceptable Cronbach’s alpha 
= .77, n = 3. 
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To test the effects of our manipulated trial factors on responses to the Comparative Worth 
Scale (CWS) a two-way ANOVA was conducted, but no significant interactions or effects were 
found. The absence of significant differences between the legal safeguard conditions does not 
lend to support to Hypotheses 1 or 2. No significant differences were found between conditions 
where the defense attorney objected or did not object to the comparative worth statements. 
Therefore directional inferences about the impact of attorney objection cannot be made, and 
Hypothesis 1 cannot be supported. Similarly, the lack of significant differences between the 
Objection Sustained and Objection Sustained with Instruction conditions prevents us from 
answering Hypothesis 2.  
To further examine the impact of the legal safeguard manipulation on jurors’ perceptions 
of the comparative worth statements, three one-way ANOVA’s were conducted to provide an 
item-by-item analysis. Legal safeguards only had a significant effect on responses to the first 
comparative worth statement, “I am talking about values… What is the life of this victim 
worth?”,  F(3, 99) = 2.91, p = .039, partial eta squared = .08. Unfortunately, this analysis also 
failed to produce any significant differences between the legal safeguard conditions (No 
Objection, M = 4.94; Objection Overruled, M = 4.54; Objection Sustained, M = 4.08; Objection 
Sustained with Instruction, M = 4.13). 
To test associations among categorical variables, hierarchical loglinear analysis was 
conducted using backward elimination. A significant IV/DV association was found between 
legal safeguard and sentence, χ2(3, n = 100) = 8.13, p = .043. Please see Table 2 for post-hoc 
crosstabulations of legal safeguard by sentence.  
The process of death-qualifying our sample resulted in an abnormal distribution among 
the troubled life mitigation present and absent conditions. Given the already small sample size, 
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there was not sufficient power to analyze between-groups differences resulting from the troubled 
life manipulation. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was omitted from testing, and the design was 
modified to a 4 (Legal Safeguard) X 2 (Victim Impact Evidence) between-subjects factorial 
design.  
Two independent samples t-tests were conducted to examine if participants’ sentence 
recommendations (measured linearly as -1 = Life in prison, +1 = Death penalty) and CWS scores 
differed as a function of exposure to victim impact evidence. No significant differences were 
found, indicating that the presence of victim impact evidence did not significantly influence 
jurors’ consideration of comparative worth statements, nor did it affect their sentencing 
decisions. Therefore, no support was found for Hypothesis 4. 
A theoretically relevant path model was conducted using multiple regression analysis, to 
test for the mediating effects of attitudes toward the death penalty on the relationship between 
affective and cognitive processes and sentencing decisions (See Appendix A). To examine 
sentencing recommendation as a linear variable, sentencing decisions were recoded (from 1 = 
Life in prison , 2 = Death penalty, to -1 = Life in prison, +1 = Death penalty). This has 
previously been done in studies examining culpability (Bornstein & Muller, 2001), and the 
influence of inadmissible testimony on verdict (Kassin, & Sukel, 1997); to our knowledge this is 
the first use of this measurement of sentence. Need for affect (NFA), need for cognition (NFC), 
pre-trial positive affect, and pre-trial negative affect (PANAS) were used as predictor variables 
of sentence, with attitudes toward the death penalty (ATDP) as a mediator.  
Independent of the other variables, ATDP significantly predicted sentence, β = .372, r2 = 
.14, p < .001. When NFA and ATDP were placed in a model together, the model was significant 
at p = .001; indicating that ATDP significantly mediated the relationship between NFA, β = .061, 
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r
2
 = .00, p < .523, and sentence, β = .372, r2 = .14, p < .001. A significant path (p = .001) 
was also found from NFC, through ATDP, to sentence; suggesting ATDP mediated the 
relationship between NFC, β = -.031, r2 = .00, p =.744, and sentence, β = .372, r2 = .14, p < .001. 
Another significant path (p = .001) demonstrated the mediating effect of ATDP on the 
relationship between pre-trial positive affect, β = .07, r2 = .01, p = .462, and sentence, β = .362, 
r
2
 = .13, p < .001. The model containing pre-trial negative affect and ATDP was also significant 
at p = .001, indicating a mediating effect of ATDP on pre-trial negative affect, β = -.069, r2 = 
.01, p = .468, and sentence, β = .018, r2 = .14, p < .001. This series of significant paths confirms 
the mediating effect of attitudes toward the death penalty predicted in Hypothesis 5. 
Discussion 
 Our findings failed to identify differential effects of our manipulated trial factors. The 
first two hypotheses tested both pertained to the anticipated influence of attorney objection and 
curative instruction on participants’ consideration of comparative worth statements in the 
prosecutor’s closing argument. Although preliminary data analysis has shown this type of 
prosecutorial misconduct does bias capital jurors, and can persuade them to recommend the 
death penalty more often than jurors not exposed to this type of misconduct (Serpa, et al., 2010); 
in the present study we were testing the legal safeguard, rather than the misconduct. In doing so, 
we have focused analysis on a manipulation of legal safeguards that has never been done before. 
This manipulation came directly from Wilson’s (2004) suggestion to compare objection-present 
versus objection-absent conditions, as well as objection overruled versus objection sustained 
conditions. 
 While Wilson’s dissertation research found significant attentional shifts in mock-jurors 
exposed to attorney objection using a similar manipulation, we were unable to locate significant 
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differences between the legal safeguard conditions. In light of the abundant cognitive literature 
which suggests task interruption is likely to increase task attention, and Wilson’s findings which 
converge with this body of literature, it would be irresponsible to assume the absence of 
differences between the legal safeguards conditions reflects a true absence of these effects in 
real-world trial settings. Given the main effect of legal safeguards on jurors’ perceptions of one 
of the comparative worth statements, the failure of between-groups differences to emerge in our 
analysis can be more reasonably attributed to potential weakness of our manipulation, or to 
inadequate power in the legal safeguard conditions.  
 The hierarchical loglinear analysis conducted to examine our categorical variables 
identified a significant association between legal safeguard and sentence. The post-hoc 
crosstabulation depicted in Table 2 shows the frequency of life imprisonment and death penalty 
recommendations in each of the four legal safeguard conditions. In each legal safeguard 
condition, the number of life imprisonment recommendations more than doubled the number of 
death penalty recommendations. This may be in part due to the fact that data was collected in a 
state which does not impose the death penalty. However, when the sample was death qualified, 
more participants were omitted for feeling the death penalty was always appropriate in capital 
trials (n = 12), than those removed for feeling the death penalty was never appropriate (n = 8). 
Therefore, death qualification may have actually skewed the sample in favor of life in this case. 
This finding, abnormal for a death qualified sample, in addition to the possible hesitance 
experienced by residents of a non-death penalty state, may have created or influenced the 
disproportionate prevalence of life imprisonment recommendations in the present study.  
 The distribution of sentence recommendations must be considered with these sample 
characteristics in mind. One interesting finding is that the objection-overruled condition 
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produced more death penalty recommendations than the no objection condition. This does 
suggest that the presence of the objection, although overruled, increased attention to the 
prosecutorial misconduct. Hypothetically, since the statement was ruled admissible, there is no 
problem with the juror’s heightened attention to it. However, from a broader perspective, we 
must recognize that just because a trial judge rules prosecutorial misconduct admissible, it does 
not mean the misconduct statements will not bias the jury. In the present study, the presence of 
an overruled objection did increase attention to the misconduct statements, resulting in a greater 
number of death penalty recommendations.  
 Although the number of death penalty recommendations in the objection sustained (n = 
1) and objection sustained with instruction (n = 2) conditions are both small, it is interesting to 
note that there were more death penalty recommendations when the judge included a curative 
instruction. This indicates that it may be the instruction, rather than the objection, which is 
responsible for any observed backfire effects in juror’s consideration of improper evidence. It is 
necessary to collect additional data to increase the cell size of each condition, to determine if this 
pattern has tenacity. 
Our sample was definitely a hindrance to our analysis of this data. While we initially 
planned the sample to consist of 100 undergraduate students and 100 community members, there 
was an evident lack of interest demonstrated by community members who agreed to participate 
but did not show up to participation sessions. The difficulty we experienced in collecting data 
among community members was exacerbated by time restrictions and other pragmatic 
limitations. As a result, our sample was substantially smaller and more homogenous than 
expected. The narrow range of age and racial background of the sample reflects the mostly-white 
college community where data was collected.  
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The present findings do not provide clear empirical support for Hypothesis 1 or 2. 
However, given the main effect of legal safeguards on perceptions of the first comparative worth 
statement, and the significant association between legal safeguard and sentence, we are 
optimistic that if additional data were collected, increasing statistical power, expected differences 
between the legal safeguard conditions would appear. The process of death qualifying the sample 
of juror-participants further reduced our sample size, and this reduction must be taken into 
account when planning future research on capital decision-making. 
Our manipulation of victim impact evidence (present versus absent) likewise failed to 
demonstrate a significant effect on consideration of comparative worth statements, and to 
influence sentence. In addition to the concerns about statistical power in the sample, there is a 
concern about the strength of the victim impact evidence presented. In our attempt to avoid a 
confound, our victim impact evidence lacked explicit emotionality. Additionally, our study was 
pencil and paper, which prevents jurors’ exposure to physical, social, and emotional cues that 
might be present in an audio or video presentation of victim impact evidence. It is likely that in 
future study of the relationship between victim impact evidence and prosecutorial misconduct, a 
more vivid presentation of victim impact evidence would elicit stronger responses, potentially 
resulting in a significant effect of the evidence. Unlike attorney objection, there is no shortage of 
research findings on victim impact evidence which broadly demonstrates its prejudicial influence 
on capital jurors. Therefore, it is more probable that the absence of a significant effect in our 
study is due to our small sample size, and the lack of emotionality in our presentation of victim 
impact evidence. 
Support was found for our last hypothesis, predicting the moderating effect of attitudes 
toward the death penalty (ATDP) on the relationship between affective and cognitive factors and 
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sentencing decision. The path model illustrated in Figure 1 identifies four predictive models 
(significant at p = .001) in which ATDP significantly moderated the relationship between 
participants’ scores on the Need for Affect, Need for Cognition, and PANAS scales, and 
sentence recommendation. When the direct relationship between these scale scores and ATDP 
was tested, no paths were significant. This indicates that ATDP scores are primarily driving the 
significance in the predictive model overall. Considering the highly significant paths achieved 
when NFA, NFC, and PANAS went through ATDP, to sentence, it is clear that ATDP had a 
strong moderating effect on these variables in predicting sentence.  
Future Research 
 This is the second study in a brand new line of research investigating juror’s treatment of 
various sources of sentencing evidence in the context of comparative value argumentation. The 
next step in this line of research is to collect additional data using the current materials in order 
to increase the chances of locating meaningful differences between the four legal safeguard 
conditions. If the attentional phenomenon described in cognitive literature still fails to appear in 
a larger sample, attorney objection must be a unique form of task interruption, impervious to 
attentional shifts. Although this outcome is not likely, it must be empirically ruled out by further 
data collection. 
 Aside from the underwhelming results obtained in this study, which may or may not be 
largely attributed to sample size and power, this study offers a novel contribution to the field by 
examining attorney objection as a legal safeguard. Due to the extremely limited literature on 
attorney objection, further research examining the timing of objections, the frequency of 
objections, perceptual differences in objections made by the prosecutor versus the defense 
attorney is necessary.  
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 In contrast, there is a large body of research on the influence of mitigation and victim 
impact evidence on capital sentencing. However, research in this area has not sufficiently 
explored the compounded effects of these prejudicial forms of evidence in the context of 
prosectorial misconduct and comparative value arguments. In this study, the statutory mitigators 
presented were age, and lack of criminal record, and the non-statutory mitigation focused on the 
defendant’s troubled upbringing. Future studies should test the influence of other statutory and 
non-statutory mitigating factors. Especially considering the mixed findings regarding juror’s 
treatment of mitigating evidence of a history of child abuse (Barnett, et al., 2007), more research 
must be conducted to examine the potential for this evidence to bias jurors exposed to 
prosecutorial misconduct in the form of comparative value arguments.  
 Another facet of research that is missing in this area is the differences between individual 
and group information processing of sentencing evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. Future 
studies should compare individual and group decision-making when jurors are exposed to 
comparative value arguments, and non-statutory sentencing evidence. Conducting mock-jury 
deliberations requires substantial time and man power, but would provide unparalleled insights 
into the deliberation process, and would bring us closer to an ecologically valid representation of 
capital sentencing procedures.  
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Table 1 
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Intercorrelations Among Comparative Worth Statements 
Statement “Whose life has more value? The defendant’s or the victim’s?” (CW2) 
“If you let this murderer walk… you are 
saying his life is worth more than the 
victim’s” (CW3) 
“I am talking about 
values…What is the life of 
this victim worth” (CW1) 
 
              r = .532*                               r = .551* 
“Whose life has more 
value? The defendant’s or 
the victim’s?” (CW2) 
 
                               r = .499* 
*p < .001 
 
Table 2 
Crosstabulation of Legal Safeguard Condition by Sentence Recommendation 
 
No Objection Objection 
Overruled 
Objection 
Sustained 
Objection 
Sustained with 
Instruction 
Life in Prison 
without Parole 
 
      n = 27    n = 19    n = 24    n = 13 
Death by Lethal 
Injection 
      n = 5    n = 9    n = 1    n = 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Path Model Diagram 
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Informed Consent Form 
 
Principal Investigators:  Alicia Serpa, B.A., Rachel Small, B.A., and Judith Platania, Ph.D. 
 
1. Purpose of the Study: This study will examine jury decision making during a capital trial. A minimum of 260 
participants will be included in this study. 
 
2. Procedures Experienced by Participants: By participating in this study, you will be asked to read a segment of 
testimony in a death penalty case. You will then fill out a questionnaire regarding your attitudes toward the 
testimony you viewed. Participation should take approximately one hour, and the questionnaires will be completed 
in the given time today. 
 
3. Confidentiality and Anonymity:  Only the investigators listed above will have access to your responses, which 
will ensure your confidentiality.  Additionally, your name will only be written on your consent form, which will be 
collected and maintained separately from your questionnaire.  Thus, your responses will remain anonymous. 
 
4. Your Rights: You have the right to decline participation without any penalties or prejudice because participation 
is strictly voluntary.  Additionally, at any point in the study if you do not feel comfortable or no longer want to 
participate, you have the right to withdraw from the study without prejudice or penalty.  You may also ask questions 
at any time during the course of the study and you may contact the primary investigator (whose name, email address 
and telephone number appear at the bottom of this form) at any time after you have participated in the study. 
 
5. Risks and Benefits of being a Participant: No physical, psychological, or emotional risks are associated with 
this study.  At any time during your participation, you are allowed to withdraw from this study without facing any 
penalties.  A potential benefit is an increased understanding of how psychological research is conducted.   
 
More Information:  After participation, please feel free to contact Dr. Judith Platania in FCAS 104, by email at 
jplatania@rwu.edu, or telephone 254-5738 should you have any additional questions. 
 
This certifies that I ___________________________________ have given my full consent to participate 
      Print your name 
 
in this study.  I am at least 18 years of age or older.  I have read this form and fully understand the content. 
 
 
_______________________________  _____________________ 
 Participant’s Signature          Date 
 
 
This certifies that I have defined and informed the participant named above of all elements pertaining to this 
research study. 
 
 
_______________________________  _____________________ 
Principal Investigator        Date 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
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PRE-TRIAL JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in our study. Your responses are important to our research. Please answer 
every question on this form by placing a check in the box that corresponds to the appropriate response.   
 
Your gender: 
  
   Male   [1] 
  Female   [2]    
 
Into which of the following age categories do you fall: 
 
  18-24   [1] 
  25-34   [2] 
  35-44   [3] 
  45-54   [4] 
  55 or older   [5] 
 
Which of the following characterizes your background? 
 
 Caucasian   [1] 
 Hispanic   [2] 
 African-American  [3] 
 Other   [4] 
 
What is your religious affiliation? 
 
 Catholic   [1] 
 Protestant   [2] 
 Jewish   [3] 
 Other                              [4] 
       
Your marital status: 
 
 Single   [1] 
 Married    [2] 
 Divorced   [3] 
 Other   [4] 
 
How would you evaluate your political views? 
 
 Liberal   [1] 
 Slightly Liberal  [2] 
 Slightly Conservative  [3] 
 Conservative   [4] 
 
Do you have a valid driver’s license? 
 
  No   [1] 
  Yes   [2] 
 
 
 
Are you a registered voter? 
 
  No   [1] 
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  Yes   [2] 
 
Have you ever served on a jury in a civil case? 
 
  No   [1] 
  Yes   [2] 
 
Have you ever served on a jury in a criminal case? 
 
  No   [1] 
  Yes   [2] 
 
What is your employment status? (Only check one)  
 
 Not working now/unemployed  [1] 
 Retired    [2] 
 Student    [3] 
 Homemaker    [4]  
 Employed full-time   [5] 
 Employed part-time   [6] 
  
Are you, a close friend of, or related to, anyone employed in the justice system? (police officer, judge, attorney, etc.) 
 
  No   [1] 
  Yes   [2] 
 
What is the highest year of education you have attained? 
 
 Less than high school   [1] 
 Attended some high school  [2] 
 High school diploma   [3] 
 Partial college or junior college [4] 
 College degree   [5] 
 Post-graduate college degree  [6] 
 
Do you feel that your views on the death penalty, either in favor or opposed, would prevent or substantially impair 
you from considering both penalties in this case? (Life in prison vs. death penalty) 
 
  No   [1] 
  Yes   [2] 
 
Which of the following best describes your view regarding the death penalty: 
 
   Appropriate in all cases where someone has been murdered.                   [1] 
  Generally appropriate with very few exceptions.                           [2] 
  Generally opposed with very few exceptions.                                          [3] 
  Opposed in every possible case where someone has been murdered.  [4] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each 
item and mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way 
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right now. Use the following scale to record your answers: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ______attentive      ______ strong     
 
 ______ irritable     ______ inspired    
 
 ______ afraid     ______ alert   
  
 ______ upset      ______ active   
 
 ______ guilty      ______ nervous   
 
 ______ excited     ______ hostile 
  
 ______ proud       ______ jittery  
 
 ______ ashamed     ______ scared   
 
 ______ enthusiastic    ______ distressed 
 
 ______ determined    ______ interested 
 
Please circle the number that corresponds most closely to how you feel. 
 
It is immoral for society to take a life regardless of the crime the individual has committed. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
Executing a person for premeditated murder discourages others from committing that crime in the future. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
The death penalty is the just way to compensate the victim’s family for some murders. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
It is more cost efficient to sentence a murderer to death rather than to life imprisonment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
The death penalty should be used more often than it is. 
 1                        2                           3                          4                        5 
very slightly or not at all            a little               moderately           quite a bit          extremely 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
There are some murderers whose death would give me a sense of personal satisfaction. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
There is no such thing as a sentence that truly means "life without parole." 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
The desire for revenge is a legitimate reason for favoring the death penalty. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
Executing a murderer is less expensive than keeping him in jail for the rest of his life. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
The death penalty does not deter other murderers. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
No matter what crime a person has committed executing them is a cruel punishment. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
Even when a murderer gets a sentence of life without parole, he usually gets out on parole. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
I think the death penalty is necessary. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
 
 
The death penalty makes criminals think twice before committing murder. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
Society has a right to get revenge when murder has been committed. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9   
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or not the statement is characteristic of you or of what you 
believe. For example, if the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you or of what you believe about yourself (not 
at all like you) please place a "1" on the line to the left of the statement. If the statement is extremely characteristic 
of you or of what you believe about yourself (very much like you) please place a "5" on the line to the left of the 
statement. You should use the following scale as you rate each of the statements below. 
 
1   2   3  4   5 
extremely  somewhat  uncertain  somewhat  extremely 
         uncharacteristic    uncharacteristic                  characteristic         characteristic 
                               of me      of me        of me       of me 
 
______ If I reflect on my past, I see that I tend to be afraid of feeling emotions. 
______ I prefer complex to simple problems. 
______ I like to dwell on my emotions.  
______ I have trouble telling the people close to me that I love them.  
______ I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
______ I wish I could feel less emotion. 
______ I feel that I need to experience strong emotions regularly.  
______ Thinking is not my idea of fun. 
______ Avoiding emotional events helps me sleep better at night. 
______ Emotions help people get along in life.  
______ I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge 
my thinking abilities. 
 
______ I am sometimes afraid of how I might act if I become too emotional.  
 
______ I am a very emotional person.  
 
______ I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think in 
depth about something. 
 
______ I feel like I need a good cry every now and then.  
 
______ I think that it is important to explore my feelings.  
 
______ I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
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______ I would love to be like “Mr. Spock,” who is totally logical and experiences little emotion.  
______ I approach situations in which I expect to experience strong emotions.  
______ I only think as hard as I have to. 
______ I like decorating my bedroom with a lot of pictures and posters of things emotionally significant to me.  
______ I find strong emotions overwhelming and therefore try to avoid them. 
______ I prefer to think about small daily projects to long term ones. 
______ I would prefer not to experience either the lows or highs of emotion.  
______ I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them. 
______ I do not know how to handle my emotions, so I avoid them.  
______ The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
______ Emotions are dangerous—they tend to get me into situations that I would rather avoid.  
______ I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
______ Acting on one’s emotions is always a mistake.  
______ Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much. 
______ We should indulge our emotions. 
______ I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles I must solve. 
______ Displays of emotion are embarrassing.  
______ The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
______ Strong emotions are generally beneficial.  
______ I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat 
important but does not require much thought. 
 
______ People can function most effectively when they are not experiencing strong emotions.  
 
______ I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that requires a lot of mental effort. 
______ The experience of emotions promotes human survival.  
______ It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works. 
______ It is important for me to be in touch with my feelings.  
______ I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally. 
______ It is important for me to know how others are feeling. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
TRIAL SIMULATION MATERIALS 
 
SUMMARY OF GUILT PHASE IN THE CASE OF: 
 
 
State v. Humphries, 325 S.C. 28, 479 S.E.2d 52, 53 (1996) 
 
 
On the morning of January 1st, 1994 Shawn Paul Humphries, then age 
22, and Eddie Blackwell, then age 19, had been drinking beer when they 
decided to rob a convenience store, owned and operated by Mendal 
“Dickie” Smith. Upon entering Smith’s store, Humphries revealed a 
stolen gun, and demanded Smith’s money. Smith reached under the 
counter, appearing to grab a stored gun; Humphries responded by firing 
one fatal shot at Smith. On August 5th, 1994, Humphries was charged 
with attempted armed robbery, possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a violent crime, criminal conspiracy, and the murder of 
“Dickie” Smith.  The events of the crime were captured by the store’s 
surveillance camera. 
 
As a result of reading the facts of the case, do you find Shawn Paul 
Humphries guilty or not guilty of the murder of “Dickie” Smith? 
 
 Not Guilty  [1] 
 Guilty  [2] 
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PRE-SENTENCING PHASE JUDGE’S INSTRUCTION 
Ladies and Gentlemen/Members of the Jury: As a juror in the sentencing phase of the capital trial of 
Shawn Paul Humphries, you will hear evidence from both the Prosecution and the Defense. After you 
have heard evidence from each side, you will be asked to recommend a sentence of either life in prison 
without parole, or death by lethal injection. “Murder” is the killing of any person with malice 
aforethought, either express or implied. When the State seeks the death penalty, upon conviction or 
adjudication of guilt of a defendant of murder, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding. A 
separate sentencing proceeding is conducted to determine whether sentence should be death or life 
imprisonment. In this proceeding, if a statutory aggravating circumstance is found, the defendant must be 
sentenced to either death or life imprisonment.  If no statutory aggravating circumstance is found, the 
defendant must be sentenced to either life imprisonment or a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment 
for thirty years.  In this sentencing proceeding, you will hear additional evidence in extenuation, 
mitigation, or aggravation of the punishment.  Only such evidence in aggravation as the State has 
informed the defendant in writing before the trial has been deemed admissible.  The State, the defendant, 
and his counsel are permitted to present arguments for or against the sentence to be imposed. The 
defendant and his counsel shall have the closing argument regarding the sentence to be imposed. At the 
close of this proceeding, I will instruct you on the law in this case and the application of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances to your recommendation of a sentence of either life in prison without parole, or 
death by lethal injection.  
OPENING STATEMENT: PROSECUTION 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, it is your duty today to decide upon the appropriate sentence for the defendant, 
Shawn Paul Humphries. The sentencing decision before you is certainly a difficult one; you must determine which 
penalty is the appropriate sentence for this crime: life imprisonment without parole, or the death penalty by lethal 
injection. This decision must be based upon the careful consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 
The jury has already found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder of the victim in the course of a robbery with a 
deadly weapon. The prosecution will present evidence that the murder of the victim was premeditated. I trust that 
after hearing the evidence presented today, you will arrive at the only appropriate sentence for this defendant – death 
by lethal injection. Thank you. 
OPENING STATEMENT: DEFENSE 
Members of the jury, today you will hear testimony from two witnesses who spent considerable time with the 
defendant, Shawn Paul Humphries. These two witnesses are here today to speak on behalf of the defendant, and to 
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inform the jury of grounds for you to spare his life. In determining which penalty is appropriate for Shawn Paul 
Humphries, you are permitted to identify any aspect of the defendant, or his background, which may lead you to 
recommend a sentence of life imprisonment.  You may hear evidence from the witnesses regarding the defendant’s 
troubled life or social value. This is considered appropriate evidence for you to consider in favor of a life sentence. I 
am confident that the testimony presented today will lead you to recommend the appropriate sentence – life 
imprisonment without parole. Thank you. 
  
PROSECUTION WITNESS ONE: DENNIS CONWAY  
  
Prosecutor: I call my first witness to the stand, the arresting officer. Please state your full name for the court. 
 
Witness: My name is Officer Dennis Conway and I have been with the city police force for almost ten years.  
 
Prosecutor: How are you involved in the case at hand? 
 
Witness: I was the first to respond on the morning of January 1st, 1994 when I received the call that there was 
robbery in progress at Dickie Smith’s convenience store. Dickie Smith had been shot in the course of the robbery.   
 
Prosecutor: Can you describe for the court the circumstances surrounding the crime? 
 
Witness: After I had arrested Shawn Paul Humphries, and read him his rights, he said, “Someone’s gonna get it 
tonight.” There was quite a bit of noise and I wasn’t sure I heard him correctly, so I asked him to repeat what he just 
said. 
 
Prosecutor: And he repeated himself. 
 
Witness: Correct. 
 
Prosecutor: What did he say again? 
 
Witness: He said, “Someone’s gonna get it tonight.”  
 
Prosecutor: Thank you for your testimony. 
 
VICTIM IMPACT WITNESS ONE: LARRY MARTINS 
 
Judge: The court calls Larry Martins to the stand; you may now read your written statement. 
 
Witness: My name is Larry Martins, I am the victim’s cousin. The defendant murdered my cousin while he was 
working at the convenience store he owned. My cousin Dickie and I were very close; we were like brothers. We did 
everything together. Dickie was a real athlete when he was younger. I have so many fond memories of us playing 
sports together. He used to beat me at every sport growing up. As adults we still had fun challenging each other to a 
basketball game or some street hockey on the weekend. Even though Dickie always won, he always showed 
humility and was never a bragger. Since I have been married and started raising a family, Dickie has always been 
welcome at my home. I would frequently invite Dickie over to barbeque at my house. Dickie was famous for his 
barbeque recipe. Many things Dickie and I did together will never be the same now that he is gone. It will be too 
painful to go back on the basketball court without my cousin. Dickie was always there for me. I just don’t think I 
could enjoy our old interests alone. And the family barbeques will definitely not be the same; his presence will be 
greatly missed.  
 
Judge: Thank you for your testimony today. 
 
   VICTIM IMPACT WITNESS TWO: SUSAN FELDMAN 
 
Judge: The court calls Susan Feldman to the stand; you may now read your written statement. 
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Witness: My name is Susan Feldman. I lived next door to the victim, Dickie Smith, prior to this unfortunate event. 
After the incident a police officer came to my house and notified me that Dickie had been murdered while working. 
Dickie was a very friendly and generous neighbor. We came to know each other quite well; we lived next door to 
one another for over ten years. We were both avid gardeners; we would often share gardening tips and exchange 
vegetables, or other things we had grown in our gardens. He would always invite me over to his cousin’s family 
barbeques. Since I live alone, I always appreciated having such a cordial neighbor. I will definitely miss his 
company. Gardening will always remind me of warm memories of Dickie, but it will also bring me some sadness.  
 
Judge: Thank you for your testimony today. 
 
DEFENSE WITNESS ONE: ANGELA CRAWFORD (Statutory Mitigator – age) 
 
Defense Attorney: I call my first witness to the stand. Please state your full name for the court. 
 
Witness: My name is Angela Crawford. 
 
Defense Attorney: How do you know the defendant? 
 
Witness: I have been a community based youth counselor for the last fifteen years. Shawn Paul Humphries was one 
of my clients for several years. 
 
Defense Attorney: Can you describe what type of community member he is? 
 
Witness: Shawn was a reserved young man. In our meetings he was always polite, although he sometimes seemed a 
little uncomfortable when I ask him to discuss personal problems.   
 
Defense Attorney: Can you describe for the Court the circumstances surrounding the crime? 
 
Witness: At the time Shawn committed the crime he was an inexperienced young man and was somewhat 
immature. Additionally, Shawn had no significant history of violent crime prior to this crime.  
 
Defense Attorney: How is it that you would have knowledge of this information? 
 
Witness: Due to the nature of our work at the Center, it is mandatory that I look into this before meeting with my 
clients.  
 
Defense Attorney: How do you specifically look into this? 
 
Witness: I check with the local probation office. They do not release any specific information. I simply asked if 
there were any record of any significant history of violent crime for Shawn. I was told there was not.  
 
Defense Attorney: Thank you for your testimony. 
 
DEFENSE WITNESS TWO: JOSEPH GLENN  
(TROUBLED LIFE MITIGATION) 
 
Defense Attorney: I call my first witness to the stand, the cousin of the defendant. Please state your full name for 
the court. 
 
Witness: My name is Joseph Glenn.  
 
Defense Attorney: How are you acquainted with the defendant? 
 
Witness: I am the defendant’s cousin.  
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Defense Attorney: Are you aware of the crime your cousin has been convicted of? 
 
Witness: Yes, my cousin was convicted of the murder of the convenience store owner, Mr. Smith.  
 
Defense Attorney: Were you and your cousin close? 
 
Witness: Yes, we were very close. We were raised as if we were siblings and spent most of our childhood together. 
We remained close into adulthood. Shawn came from a very troubled home-life, and he spent a lot of time at my 
house. 
 
Defense Attorney: Can you explain what you mean by troubled home-life? 
 
Witness: Well, my aunt and uncle had a lot of problems with their marriage, stemming from my uncle’s alcohol 
abuse. Unfortunately he didn’t give a lot of attention to give Shawn, unless it was to scream at him or hit him. My 
uncle always drank after work, and he had no control of his temper. When he was drunk he was verbally and 
physically abusive toward my aunt, and toward Shawn if he tried to stop the fight or intervene. Because his parents 
fought so much, Shawn and I spent a lot of time together after school.  
 
Defense Attorney: Can you describe to the court some of the activities you and your cousin recently enjoyed? 
 
Witness: Shawn and I go camping most weekends, especially when the weather is nice. During the day we fish out 
on the lake. At night we build a fire, and invite a few old friends over. Shawn and I also share a passion for cars. We 
would often fix up older cars and go to auto shows when they came to town.   
 
Defense Attorney: Will you still enjoy these activities without your cousin? 
 
Witness: No, I would not be able to go camping or work on cars without him. It would be very painful for me to do 
the things we loved doing together without him there. He is like an older brother to me; I will miss him very much if 
he is not around.  
 
Defense Attorney: Thank you for testifying on your cousin’s behalf. 
 
DEFENSE WITNESS THREE: PATRICIA WILLIAMS 
(TROUBLED LIFE MITIGATION) 
 
Defense Attorney: I call my second witness to the stand, the guidance counselor of the defendant. Please state your 
full name for the court. 
 
Witness: My name is Patricia Williams.  
 
Defense Attorney: How are you acquainted with the defendant? 
 
Witness: For the last fifteen years I have been employed as a guidance counselor at the local high school; Shawn 
was one of my students.   
 
Defense Attorney: Are you aware of the crime your prior student was convicted of? 
 
Witness: Yes, I read in the newspaper that Shawn was convicted of the murder of Mr. Smith.  
 
Defense Attorney: How well do you know the defendant? 
 
Witness: Shawn and I spoke frequently. The school requires every student to meet their guidance counselor twice a 
year, but Shawn would usually come to my office once or twice a week.  
 
Defense Attorney: Can you describe to the jury what typically takes place during your meetings with Shawn? 
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Witness: Well, Shawn usually talked to me about disciplinary problems he experienced at school. He had a lot of 
anger toward the school administration because the principle reprimanded him so often. It seemed that Shawn could 
barely get through a school day without somehow getting the principle’s attention. The principle never seemed to 
notice Shawn’s efforts to comply with school rules, but disciplined him for every mistake.  
 
Defense Attorney: Can you describe an instance when Shawn was disciplined by the principle? 
 
Witness: Shawn received detention afterschool so often, it didn’t seem to bother him by his second year. However, 
when the principle suspended Shawn during his third year, for a fight Shawn insisted was not his fault, Shawn 
became furious with the school administration. I explained the school’s zero-tolerance violence policy – both 
students involved are suspended regardless of who claims to be responsible. After that incident, Shawn’s attitude 
toward school took a downward spiral. 
 
Defense Attorney: Thank you for your testimony today. 
 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY CLOSING ARGUMENT 
 
Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen of the jury. Today you have a difficult task before you – you must recommend 
a sentence for the defendant, Shawn Paul Humphries. Shawn Paul Humphries has been convicted of the murder of 
Mendal “Dickie” Smith, and it is your job to decide whether life imprisonment or death by lethal injection is the 
most appropriate punishment. You have read testimony from individuals who are close to the defendant. His cousin 
Joseph Glenn, and his guidance counselor Patricia Williams each offered testimony regarding aspects of the 
defendant’s life. Their testimony describes the defendant as having been affected by circumstances in life as well as 
having an impact on the lives of the people he knew. Shawn Paul Humphries is a productive member of the 
community who reaches out and is quick to help others. However, as a result of his actions, this defendant has hurt 
himself as well as many others around him. This is not about whether the defendant will be excused. There is no 
excuse for what Shawn Humphries did. Nothing excuses or justifies his crime. When you consider mitigating 
evidence it isn’t to excuse or justify. He is responsible for what he did. That’s why we are here, at the point of 
sentencing. Mitigating evidence is offered to help you understand what he did, not to excuse or justify it. We learn 
about the place of mercy and compassion. Here the law makes room for mercy and compassion. We are proud of our 
law because it allows us to show mercy. There are two mitigating circumstances to this crime you are allowed to 
consider: The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal conviction involving the use of violence against 
another person; and the age or mentality of the defendant at the time of the crime. In addition, if you find anything 
about Shawn Humphries’ life and background that makes him worthy of not being killed – If anything merits mercy 
whether you’ve heard it or not, you can vote for life in prison rather than death. So ladies and gentlemen, now that 
you are familiar with my points on this position, I ask, on behalf of the defense, that you put Shawn in prison for the 
rest of his natural life. Truly, that is not a pleasant thing either. However, it is the only choice that we believe is 
appropriate in this case. Thank you. 
PROSECUTOR CLOSING ARGUMENT 
(NO OBJECTION) 
 
Shawn Paul Humphries comes into this courtroom asking you for mercy. I ask you what mercy did he give the 
victim - None. Shawn Paul Humphries comes in here and asks you for life, and he gave death. Is that fair? Is that 
justice? You have the right to look at the uniqueness of the individual when deciding this case and I would submit to 
you that Dickie Smith, by everybody's description to you was a unique individual. In 1984 Dickie Smith met his 
wife, and they fell in love, and they got married. In 1986, Dickie Smith starts building homes in the community he 
had grown up in. Then in 1988, the victim and his wife have a little baby girl. And in the spring of 1992, 
DickieSmith, opens the doors to his new company, building a business – helping to sustain a community. Dickie 
Smith had values; x everyone in the community felt his values. I am talking about values, because a jury verdict is a 
statement of values. And I am not talking about dollars and cents as far as what the life of Dickie Smith is worth, but 
nevertheless it is a question of values. What is the life of this victim worth? (CW1) Is it worth the life of this man, 
this killer? When you look at a case like this, when you look at the aggravation, when you look at the total lack of 
mitigation, I would submit, when you look at the character of this Defendant, and when you look at Dickie Smith, 
you will realize that the reason we have the death penalty is because the right of the innocent people to live 
outweighs the right of the guilty not to die. Whose life is more important to you? Whose life has more value – the 
defendant's or the victim's? (CW1) When you decide this case you look a number of things: You look at the 
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aggravating circumstances in the case – murder with robbery and premeditation. We have established that. You look 
at any mitigating factors the defense has presented to you. And the last thing you look at is the victim, his 
uniqueness and the suffering to the victim’s family that this defendant caused? Those are the four things you look at. 
What punishment do you recommend when a man is defending his store, he's defending what he has built? What 
punishment do you recommend when someone like Dickie Smith is taken from us. Justice – that’s what you are here 
for. It's up to you.  If you let this murderer walk out of this courtroom with his life then you are saying that his life is 
worth more than the victim's.I urge you to assign the defendant his value on the basis that he committed an 
aggravated murder. He should be found less valuable because he is a convicted killer (CW1) 
 
PROSECUTOR CLOSING ARGUMENT 
(OBJECTION OVERRULED) 
 
Shawn Paul Humphries comes into this courtroom asking you for mercy. I ask you what mercy did he give the 
victim - None. Shawn Paul Humphries comes in here and asks you for life, and he gave death. Is that fair? Is that 
justice? You have the right to look at the uniqueness of the individual when deciding this case and I would submit to 
you that Dickie Smith, by everybody's description to you was a unique individual. In 1984 Dickie Smith met his 
wife, and they fell in love, and they got married. In 1986, Dickie Smith starts building homes in the community he 
had grown up in. Then in 1988, the victim and his wife have a little baby girl. And in the spring of 1992, 
DickieSmith, opens the doors to his new company, building a business – helping to sustain a community. Dickie 
Smith had values; x everyone in the community felt his values. I am talking about values, because a jury verdict is a 
statement of values. And I am not talking about dollars and cents as far as what the life of Dickie Smith is worth, but 
nevertheless it is a question of values. What is the life of this victim worth? Is it worth the life of this man, this 
killer?  
 
Defense Attorney: Your Honor, I object to the Prosecutor’s line of argument on the grounds that it is an improper 
extension of Payne v. Tennessee. 
 
Judge: The objection is overruled. Counselor, you may continue. 
 
When you look at a case like this, when you look at the aggravation, when you look at the total lack of mitigation, I 
would submit, when you look at the character of this Defendant, and when you look at Dickie Smith, you will 
realize that the reason we have the death penalty is because the right of the innocent people to live outweighs the 
right of the guilty not to die. Whose life is more important to you? Whose life has more value – the defendant's or 
the victim's? When you decide this case you look a number of things: You look at the aggravating circumstances in 
the case – murder with robbery and premeditation. We have established that.You look at any mitigating factors the 
defense has presented to you. And the last thing you look at is the victim, his uniqueness and the suffering to the 
victim’s family that this defendant caused? Those are the four things you look at. What punishment do you 
recommend when a man is defending his store, he's defending what he has built? What punishment do you 
recommend when someone like Dickie Smith is taken from us. Justice – that’s what you are here for. It's up to you.  
If you let this murderer walk out of this courtroom with his life then you are saying that his life is worth more than 
the victim's.I urge you to assign the defendant his value on the basis that he committed an aggravated murder. He 
should be found less valuable because he is a convicted killer. 
 
PROSECUTOR CLOSING ARGUMENT 
(OBJECTION SUSTAINED) 
 
Shawn Paul Humphries comes into this courtroom asking you for mercy. I ask you what mercy did he give the 
victim - None. Shawn Paul Humphries comes in here and asks you for life, and he gave death. Is that fair? Is that 
justice? You have the right to look at the uniqueness of the individual when deciding this case and I would submit to 
you that Dickie Smith, by everybody's description to you was a unique individual. In 1984 Dickie Smith met his 
wife, and they fell in love, and they got married. In 1986, Dickie Smith starts building homes in the community he 
had grown up in. Then in 1988, the victim and his wife have a little baby girl. And in the spring of 1992, 
DickieSmith, opens the doors to his new company, building a business – helping to sustain a community. Dickie 
Smith had values; x everyone in the community felt his values. I am talking about values, because a jury verdict is a 
statement of values. And I am not talking about dollars and cents as far as what the life of Dickie Smith is worth, but 
nevertheless it is a question of values. What is the life of this victim worth? Is it worth the life of this man, this 
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killer?  
 
Defense Attorney: Your Honor, I object to the Prosecutor’s line of argument on the grounds that it is an improper 
extension of Payne v. Tennessee. 
 
Judge: The objection is sustained. 
 
When you look at a case like this, when you look at the aggravation, when you look at the total lack of mitigation, I 
would submit, when you look at the character of this Defendant, and when you look at Dickie Smith, you will 
realize that the reason we have the death penalty is because the right of the innocent people to live outweighs the 
right of the guilty not to die. Whose life is more important to you? Whose life has more value – the defendant's or 
the victim's? When you decide this case you look a number of things: You look at the aggravating circumstances in 
the case – murder with robbery and premeditation. We have established that.You look at any mitigating factors the 
defense has presented to you. And the last thing you look at is the victim, his uniqueness and the suffering to the 
victim’s family that this defendant caused? Those are the four things you look at. What punishment do you 
recommend when a man is defending his store, he's defending what he has built? What punishment do you 
recommend when someone like Dickie Smith is taken from us. Justice – that’s what you are here for. It's up to you.  
If you let this murderer walk out of this courtroom with his life then you are saying that his life is worth more than 
the victim's.I urge you to assign the defendant his value on the basis that he committed an aggravated murder. He 
should be found less valuable because he is a convicted killer. 
 
PROSECUTOR CLOSING ARGUMENT 
(OBJECTION SUSTAINED WITH INSTRUCTION) 
 
Shawn Paul Humphries comes into this courtroom asking you for mercy. I ask you what mercy did he give the 
victim - None. Shawn Paul Humphries comes in here and asks you for life, and he gave death. Is that fair? Is that 
justice? You have the right to look at the uniqueness of the individual when deciding this case and I would submit to 
you that Dickie Smith, by everybody's description to you was a unique individual. In 1984 Dickie Smith met his 
wife, and they fell in love, and they got married. In 1986, Dickie Smith starts building homes in the community he 
had grown up in. Then in 1988, the victim and his wife have a little baby girl. And in the spring of 1992, 
DickieSmith, opens the doors to his new company, building a business – helping to sustain a community. Dickie 
Smith had values; x everyone in the community felt his values. I am talking about values, because a jury verdict is a 
statement of values. And I am not talking about dollars and cents as far as what the life of Dickie Smith is worth, but 
nevertheless it is a question of values. What is the life of this victim worth? Is it worth the life of this man, this 
killer?  
 
Defense Attorney: Your Honor, I object to the Prosecutor’s line of argument on the grounds that it is an improper 
extension of Payne v. Tennessee. 
 
Judge: The objection is sustained. Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, there was an objection by the Defense to the 
Prosecutor’s line of argument, which was sustained. Closing arguments are not evidence for your consideration. In 
his closing argument, the prosecutor has made several statements comparing the worth of the defendant's life with 
that of his victim or comparing the way in which the defendant and the victim lived their lives. This line of argument 
is inflammatory. Consider the case as though this line of argument was not expressed. 
 
When you look at a case like this, when you look at the aggravation, when you look at the total lack of mitigation, I 
would submit, when you look at the character of this Defendant, and when you look at Dickie Smith, you will 
realize that the reason we have the death penalty is because the right of the innocent people to live outweighs the 
right of the guilty not to die. Whose life is more important to you? Whose life has more value – the defendant's or 
the victim's? When you decide this case you look a number of things: You look at the aggravating circumstances in 
the case – murder with robbery and premeditation. We have established that.You look at any mitigating factors the 
defense has presented to you. And the last thing you look at is the victim, his uniqueness and the suffering to the 
victim’s family that this defendant caused? Those are the four things you look at. What punishment do you 
recommend when a man is defending his store, he's defending what he has built? What punishment do you 
recommend when someone like Dickie Smith is taken from us. Justice – that’s what you are here for. It's up to you.  
If you let this murderer walk out of this courtroom with his life then you are saying that his life is worth more than 
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the victim's.I urge you to assign the defendant his value on the basis that he committed an aggravated murder. He 
should be found less valuable because he is a convicted killer. 
 
PRE-DELIBERATION JUDGE’S INSTRUCTION 
Ladies and Gentlemen/Members of the jury: Now that you have heard the testimony and the arguments of 
the lawyers, it is my duty to instruct you on the law that applies to this case. It is your duty to accept the 
rules of law as I give them to you whether you agree with them or not. You must not be influenced by any 
personal likes or dislikes, opinions, prejudices or sympathies in forming your decision. In following my 
instructions, you must follow all of them and not single out some and ignore others; they are all equally 
important. And you must not read into these instructions or into anything I may have said or done any 
suggestion as to what verdict you should return - that is a matter entirely for you to decide. The evidence 
from which you are to decide what the facts are consists of: (1) the sworn testimony of witnesses, both on 
direct and cross-examination, regardless of who called the witnesses; (2) the existence of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances in the case. In reaching your verdict, you may consider only the testimony 
received into evidence. Certain things are not evidence, and you may not consider them in deciding what 
the facts are. I will list these things for you: arguments and statements by lawyers are not evidence. The 
lawyers are not witnesses. What they have said in their opening statements and closing arguments is 
intended to help you interpret the evidence, but it is not evidence. You must also decide the credibility of 
witnesses and which testimony you will believe. You are the sole judges of the credibility, or 
believability, of each witness. You may believe all or any part or nothing of what a witness said while on 
the stand. In determining whether to believe any witness, you should apply the same tests of truthfulness 
that you apply in your own everyday affairs. All of these are matters for you to consider in finding the 
facts. 
“Murder” is the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied. When the State 
seeks the death penalty, upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of murder, the court shall 
conduct a separate sentencing proceeding. A separate sentencing proceeding is conducted to determine 
whether sentence should be death or life imprisonment. You have just heard the prosecution and defense 
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opening statements, testimony from their witnesses, and each of their closing arguments in this case. If 
you have found, during this proceeding, the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance the 
defendant must be sentenced to either death or life imprisonment.  If no statutory aggravating 
circumstance is found, the defendant must be sentenced to either life imprisonment or a mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment for thirty years. 
The jury shall consider mitigating circumstances otherwise authorized or allowed by law and the 
following statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances, which may be supported by the evidence:   
Statutory aggravating circumstances:  
(1) The murder was committed while in the commission of a robbery while armed with a deadly weapon.  
(2) The defendant committed the murder after substantial planning and premeditation. 
Mitigating circumstances:  
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal conviction involving the use of violence 
against another person.  
(2) The age or mentality of the defendant at the time of the crime.  
(3) Any other mitigating matter concerning the background, character, or record of the defendant or the 
circumstances of his offense including evidence of a troubled life and evidence of the value of his life. 
The statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances, must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Unless at least one statutory aggravating circumstance is found, the death penalty must not be imposed. 
The prosecution has introduced what is known as victim impact evidence. Victim impact evidence is not 
the same as evidence of a statutory aggravating circumstance. Introduction of victim impact evidence 
does not relieve the state of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a statutory 
aggravating circumstance. This evidence is simply another method of informing you about the harm 
caused by the crime in question. To the extent that you find that this evidence reflects on the defendant's 
culpability, you may consider it, but you may not use it as a substitute for proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt of the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance and limit the scope of the evidence 
presented.  
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APPENDIX D 
 
POST-TRIAL JUROR QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Please place a check in the box that corresponds with your response. 
 
Please recommend a sentence for the defendant in this case. 
 
  Life in prison  [1] 
  Death by lethal injection   [2] 
 
Please circle the number that corresponds most closely to how you feel. 
 
How confident are you of your sentencing recommendation? 
 
 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
      Not at all confident         Completely confident 
 
Using the following scale, please record the number that reflects your credibility rating of each person listed. 
 
 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
      Not at all credible         Completely credible 
Prosecutor’s first witness, Dennis Conway                    _______ 
 
Prosecutor’s second witness, Larry Martins _______ 
 
Prosecutor’s third witness, Susan Feldman _______ 
 
Defense’s first witness, Angela Crawford                      _______ 
 
Defense’s second witness, Joseph Glenn _______ 
 
Defense’s third witness, Patricia Williams _______ 
 
The Prosecutor _______ 
 
The Defense Attorney _______ 
 
 
Please circle the number that corresponds most closely to how you feel. 
 
Based on the testimony, how troubled was the defendant’s life?  
 
 1  2 3 4 5 6 7         8 
       Not at all troubled         Completely troubled 
 
Based on the testimony, how valuable was the defendant to society?  
 
 1  2 3 4 5 6 7      8 
       Not at all valuable        Completely valuable 
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Based on the testimony, to what extent do you believe the victim’s death was a unique loss to his family? 
 
 1  2 3 4 5 6 7      8 
          Not at all a unique loss          An extremely unique loss  
How seriously did you take your role as a juror in this case? 
 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
          Not at all serious      Completely serious 
 
Circle the number that most closely matches how much you weighed each statement in reaching your sentencing 
decision. 
 
“Shawn Paul Humphries is a productive member of the community who reaches out and is quick to help others.”  
 
 1 2  3      4      5  6      7   
Weighed in favor of life   Did not weigh in decision   Weighed in favor of death 
 
“If you find anything about Shawn Humphries’ life and background that makes him worthy of not being killed – If 
anything merits mercy whether you’ve heard it or not, you can vote for life in prison rather than death.” 
 
 1 2  3      4      5  6      7   
Weighed in favor of life   Did not weigh in decision   Weighed in favor of death 
 
“I am talking about values, because a jury verdict is a statement of values. And I am not talking about dollars and 
cents as far as what the life of Dickie Smith is worth, but nevertheless it is a question of values. What is the life of 
this victim worth? Is it worth the life of this man, this killer?”  
 
 1 2  3      4      5  6      7   
Weighed in favor of life   Did not weigh in decision   Weighed in favor of death 
 
“The reason we have the death penalty is because the right of the innocent people to live outweighs the right of the 
guilty not to die. Whose life is more important to you? Whose life has more value? The defendant's or the victim's?”  
 
 1 2  3      4      5  6      7   
Weighed in favor of life   Did not weigh in decision   Weighed in favor of death 
 
“If you let this murderer walk out of this courtroom with his life then you are saying that his life is worth more than 
the victim's. I urge you to assign the defendant his value on the basis that he committed an aggravated murder. He 
should be found less valuable because he is a convicted killer.” 
 
 1 2  3      4      5  6      7   
Weighed in favor of life   Did not weigh in decision   Weighed in favor of death 
 
“And the last thing you look at is the suffering to the victim’s family that this defendant caused.” 
 
 1 2  3      4      5  6      7   
Weighed in favor of life   Did not weigh in decision   Weighed in favor of death 
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The murder was committed while in the commission of a robbery while armed with a deadly weapon.  
 
 1 2  3      4      5  6      7   
Weighed in favor of life   Did not weigh in decision   Weighed in favor of death 
The defendant committed the murder after substantial planning and premeditation. 
 1 2  3      4      5  6      7   
Weighed in favor of life   Did not weigh in decision   Weighed in favor of death 
 
The harm caused by the crime in question. 
 
 1 2  3      4      5  6      7   
Weighed in favor of life   Did not weigh in decision   Weighed in favor of death 
 
The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal conviction involving the use of violence against another 
person.   
 
 1 2  3      4      5  6      7   
Weighed in favor of life   Did not weigh in decision   Weighed in favor of death 
 
The age or mentality of the defendant at the time of crime. 
 
 1 2  3      4      5  6      7   
Weighed in favor of life   Did not weigh in decision   Weighed in favor of death 
 
Testimony that described the defendant as having a troubled life. 
 
 1 2  3      4      5  6      7   
Weighed in favor of life   Did not weigh in decision   Weighed in favor of death 
 
Testimony that described the defendant has having a valued life. 
 
 1 2  3      4      5  6      7   
Weighed in favor of life   Did not weigh in decision   Weighed in favor of death 
 
Please circle the number that corresponds most closely to how you feel. 
 
How important is it for jurors to disregard inadmissible evidence in reaching sentence? 
1 2  3      4      5  6      7 
         Unimportant                                                                                                                                  Important 
How important is it to make an accurate  sentencing decision, regardless of court rules or technicalities? 
1 2  3      4      5  6      7 
         Unimportant                                                                                                                                  Important 
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How important is it to see that due process (i.e. following rules and procedures) was carried out in determining 
sentence? 
1 2  3      4      5  6      7 
         Unimportant                                                                                                                                  Important 
Please place a check in the box that corresponds to the appropriate response. 
When a judge overrules an attorney’s objection to evidence, which of the following is correct? 
   The evidence is proper for the jury to consider   [1] 
  The evidence is improper for the jury to consider   [2] 
When a judge sustains an attorney’s objection to evidence, which of the following is correct? 
   The evidence is proper for the jury to consider   [1] 
  The evidence is improper for the jury to consider   [2] 
If the defense attorney objected, how did the judge respond? 
 The judge overruled the defense attorney’s objection    [1] 
 The judge sustained the defense attorney’s objection    [2] 
  The judge sustained the defense attorney’s objection and instructed the jury [3] 
  The defense attorney did not object      [4] 
 
Please indicate whether or not the judge made the following statements in his instructions to the jury: 
 
If you have found, during this proceeding, the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance the defendant must 
be sentenced to death.   
 
  The judge made this statement in his instructions to the jury  [1] 
  The judge did not make this statement in his instructions to the jury [2] 
 
 
If you have found, during this proceeding, the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance the defendant must 
be sentenced to either life imprisonment or death.   
 
  The judge made this statement in his instructions to the jury  [1] 
  The judge did not make this statement in his instructions to the jury [2] 
 
If you have found, during this proceeding, the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance the defendant must 
be sentenced to life imprisonment.   
 
  The judge made this statement in his instructions to the jury  [1] 
  The judge did not make this statement in his instructions to the jury [2] 
 
If no statutory aggravating circumstance is found, the defendant must be sentenced to either life imprisonment or a 
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for thirty years. 
 
  The judge made this statement in his instructions to the jury  [1] 
  The judge did not make this statement in his instructions to the jury [2] 
 
Victim impact evidence may be substituted for the existence of an aggravating circumstance in the case. 
 
  The judge made this statement in his instructions to the jury  [1] 
  The judge did not make this statement in his instructions to the jury [2] 
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This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each 
item and mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way 
right now. Use the following scale to record your answers: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ______attentive      ______ strong     
 
 ______ irritable     ______ inspired    
 
 ______ afraid     ______ alert   
  
 ______ upset      ______ active   
 
 ______ guilty      ______ nervous   
 
 ______ excited     ______ hostile 
 
 ______ proud       ______ jittery  
 
 ______ ashamed     ______ scared   
 
 ______ enthusiastic    ______ distressed 
 
 ______ determined    ______ interested 
 
 
 
 
Using the following scale, please indicate to what extent you think people should be concerned about the 
following victims. 
 
 1  2  3  4  5  
         Not at all concerned                                Extremely concerned 
 
Victims of kidnapping  ________  Murder Victims    ________ 
 
Sexual Assault victims  ________  Female victims   ________ 
 
Victims of violent assault  ________  Victims of child molestation ________ 
 
Child Victims   ________  Rape Victims   ________ 
 
Victims of domestic assault ________  Victims of hate crimes  _______ 
 
  
 1                        2                           3                          4                        5 
very slightly or not at all            a little               moderately           quite a bit          extremely 
 
COMPARATIVE VALUE ARGUMENTS  70 
 
Appendix E 
 
Debriefing Sheet 
 
We appreciate your participation in our study on juror perceptions.  The responses you provided 
will be used to examine effects of the prosecutor’s statements on sentencing decisions in capital 
cases. For addition information about confession evidence, the following is an excellent 
resource: 
 
Platania, J., & Moran, G. (1999). Due process and the death penalty: The role of prosecutorial 
misconduct in closing argument in capital trials.  Law and Human Behavior, 23, 471-486. 
 
If you have any concerns regarding this study, please feel free to contact Dr. Judith Platania in 
the Feinstein College of Arts and Sciences Building Office 104, via e-mail at jplatania@rwu.edu 
or at 401-254-5738. Thank you for your participation.  *If you are experiencing stress and need 
assistance, please contact the Roger Williams University Counseling Center at (401) 254-3124. 
 
 
 
